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Introduction
Economists have long recognized that there may be important differences between transactions that occur within a firm and transactions that take place in external markets. One important area where these differences may manifest themselves is in the allocation of employees to jobs. Consequently, recent empirical work has devoted considerable attention towards understanding how internal labor markets function. These studies have identified several interesting empirical patterns that characterize career profiles within an employing organization. However, because of data limitations, many of these studies use data from a single employer and ignore the role of the external labor market in the evolution of careers.
In this paper we directly compare and contrast internal and external labor market transactions by constructing a dataset on the job movements of professional (American) football coaches both within and across employers. In our analysis we focus primarily on promotions from level-two positions (i.e., offensive and defensive coordinator positions) to level-one positions (i.e., head coach positions). This labor market is ideal for our purposes since career movements can be identified from public sources. In addition, we are able to construct detailed objective performance metrics that measure the performance of both the organization as a whole (team performance) and the specific activity overseen by the individual (offensive performance or defensive performance). Since the positions we examine are very senior positions and the industry is characterized by a great deal of inter-firm movement, our results are most likely to generalize to other labor markets with these key characteristics. We suspect that one such market is the market for senior managerial talent at publicly traded firms.
Our first empirical goal is to determine whether internal and external labor markets differ in the mechanism that they use in choosing individuals for promotions. After identifying some important differences, we then attempt to determine the characteristics of the internal labor market that result in the observed differences. While much of our focus is on the differences between internal and external labor markets, our findings also add to the existing body of knowledge concerning how each of these labor markets function. In particular, in contrast to almost all prior studies, we are able to look directly at the role of objective measures of an individual's performance in the internal and external assessment of that individual's ability. We are also able to examine the tournament nature of internal promotions, since typically a firm has two individuals occupying a level-two position vying for a single level-one spot.
When we estimate models predicting external labor market promotions, we find that individual performance measures are significantly positively related to the likelihood of a leveltwo individual being hired to a level-one position at a new employer. In contrast, individual performance measures have a negative and insignificant effect on the likelihood of an internal promotion. This evidence indicates that the incentives generated by promotion prospects near the top of a hierarchy may be driven primarily by external rather than internal career opportunities.
To examine why internal promotions are not related to individual performance metrics, we consider the dynamics of the promotion process. For a given individual to be promoted internally it must be the case that (a) there is an opening for an insider, and (b) the firm chooses the individual over other internal candidates. It turns out that the process governing openings is negatively related to an individual's performance, while the process governing being chosen for the job conditional on an opening is positively related to an individual's performance. Since the two effects roughly cancel out, there is no positive relationship between individual performance and internal promotions. This evidence suggests that the notion of slot constraints and job congestion near the top of an organizational hierarchy needs to be taken seriously in thinking about careers.
With regards to external labor market promotions, we present evidence that the labor market's inferences concerning an individual's ability depend on individual rather than team measures of performance. In particular, while individual performance metrics are significantly related to the likelihood of an external promotion, team performance appears to have no independent effect on this likelihood. This finding may have interesting implications for whether organizations should report disaggregated performance data (e.g., division-level performance metrics in a multi-division firm) that may allow the labor market to more effectively poach their best employees.
While most of our focus is related to the promotion process, we also have some data on lateral movements of coaches across teams. Our evidence here indicates that most lateral movements reflect a process where level-two coaches are let go following poor team performance. Within this set of laid off individuals, those with the best individual performance tend to be able to secure comparable positions at a new employer. It also appears that there is a significant amount of relationship-specific human capital in this labor market. When head coaches are fired, their level-two subordinates very frequently also find themselves out of work.
When head coaches are hired, they tend to bring along individuals that they worked with in the past.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relevant literature and motivate our empirical investigation. In section 3 we discuss our data and sample selection procedures. Our main evidence on differences between internal and external promotions is presented in section 4. We investigate the dynamics of internal job openings and promotions in Section 5. In section 6 we examine lateral job movements and some evidence on relationship specific human capital. Section 7 concludes.
Upward mobility in the labor market

Theories of internal labor market promotions
One set of theories regarding internal promotions focuses on the role of promotions as pure incentive devices (e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981) ). The insights from this literature suggest that firms may use promotions as a way of committing to an incentive scheme that elicits appropriate effort from their employees.
1 While promotions may very well generate incentives for agents to take actions that help them move up the hierarchy, several authors have pointed out that promotions may not be the best way to solve a pure incentive problem (e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) ). In particular, since promotions involve a change in an individual's job responsibilities, it is not clear that using promotions for pure incentive reasons will generate the optimal assignment of individuals to jobs.
A second set of theories regarding internal promotions abstracts from incentive considerations and focuses on the role of promotions as an optimal assignment mechanism.
2 Underlying many of these models is the basic idea exploited by Rosen (1982) that more talented individuals should be assigned to higher positions in a hierarchy. Talent can have many 1 For more on tournaments, see Rosen (1986) , Main, O'Reilly, and Wade (1993) , and Bognanno (2001) . 2 For an overview of this literature, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) and the references cited therein.
dimensions, including an innate ability component that is learned by employers over time, and a human capital component that grows with experience. Optimal assignment considerations would then suggest that individuals are promoted when information concerning their ability and/or skills developed on the job dictate that they are optimally assigned to a more senior position. Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) present a model of promotions and wage dynamics inside of firms that incorporates these elements and is consistent with some of the existing evidence on the promotion and wage process observed in firms.
It is worth noting here that while internal promotions in firms may be structured primarily to optimally match individuals to jobs, if the job assignment process is affected by employers' beliefs concerning innate ability, there is still likely to be an incentive for individuals to take actions that affect the ability inference process (see Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982) ). Thus, even if promotions are not specifically designed for incentive purposes, the mechanism governing promotion decisions could have important incentive effects. One of the goals of our study is to understand exactly what these incentive effects are.
An issue that is related to the role of promotions as an optimal assignment mechanism arises from the possibility that in some employment settings, particularly near the top of a hierarchy, the number of jobs of a particular type or level may be fixed by technological or organizational considerations. For example, a firm typically can have only one Chief Executive
Officer. In these settings where there are "slot constraints" on jobs, the internal promotion process will be linked to the mechanism governing job openings. 3 An individual's superior must depart in order for the individual to have a chance of getting a higher-level position. If job openings rarely arise when an organization is performing well, there may be very little chance of a subordinate being promoted following strong performance. 4 Thus, the incentive effect from internal promotions may be weaker than one would expect in a setting where job openings arise exogenously or where jobs can be created to appropriately match an individual's talents to a position.
Empirical evidence on internal promotions
Several studies have examined the internal promotion process. 5 Since wage changes are often large when an individual is promoted (see Murphy (1985) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994b) ), it is clear that incentives generated by promotions can be substantial. In examining the internal promotion mechanism, several findings in previous studies are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals exhibit substantial heterogeneity in innate ability and that inferences concerning ability affect job assignments. In particular, existing evidence suggests that individuals who were most recently promoted are more likely to be promoted again,
suggesting that a long tenure on the current job is a proxy for low ability (i.e., a long tenure indicates that an individual has been passed over). There is also evidence that other measures of ability, including past wage growth and subjective performance measures, affect the likelihood of promotion.
While the existing literature on the promotion mechanism establishes many interesting findings, there are still some important missing links. First, for reasons of data availability, many of the existing studies are limited to a single firm. Consequently, the generality of their 4 A related issue is whether the firm decides to choose an insider or an outsider when there is a job opening. If firms tend to choose outsiders, this will have a deleterious effect on internal promotion incentives. For an analysis of this type, see Chan (1996) . 5 See Medoff and Abraham (1980), Lazear (1992) , Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach (1993) , Holmström (1994a), and Gibbs (1995) .
findings is unclear. Second, the relationship between objective measures of individual performance and internal promotions has not been firmly established. This is important, since there are alternative interpretations to some of the existing findings. For example, individuals who receive high subjective performance marks from superiors may not be promoted because they are the most able. Instead, firms may choose who they want to promote for other reasons and then assign them high performance marks. If we can establish that a high level of objective performance leads to an increased likelihood of an internal promotion, we will have stronger evidence that promotion policies are influenced by learning and optimal job matching considerations. In addition, this evidence would indicate that individuals have an incentive to increase their observed performance to increase their likelihood of promotion.
A third issue that is not addressed in existing empirical studies is the role of slot constraints in the promotion process and in promotion-based incentives. This could be a particularly important issue near the top of a hierarchy, as pointed out by Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) . For high-level employees, the nature of promotion-based incentives is difficult to assess without understanding the process governing (a) job openings, (b) the decision to hire an insider, and (c) the decision of which insider to hire. We hope to shed light on these issues in our analysis.
The external labor market
Many of the factors that govern promotions within the internal labor market should also, at least in theory, govern promotions in the external labor market. In particular, if the ability of an individual is revealed to be high, it may be optimal for the individual to switch to an employer who can more efficiently use the individual's talents. Consistent with this hypothesis, Fee and Hadlock (2002a) present evidence that high-level executives at superior performing firms tend to jump to better jobs at new employers.
While similar economic considerations may govern internal and external labor market promotions, there are several reasons to expect there to be differences in these promotion mechanisms. First, for positions with a substantial amount of firm-specific human capital, it is unlikely that individuals will find their services to be worth more outside the firm than they are worth to the current employer. Thus, the overall rate of internal promotions may substantially exceed the rate of external promotions. Second, for many positions it is likely that the current employer has different information regarding the employee than does the outside market. 6 Thus, the performance metrics that predict internal promotions may vary from those that predict external promotions.
A third potential difference between internal and external promotion mechanisms arises from the observation that promotion opportunities in the external labor market are likely to arise for reasons that are independent of how an individual is performing, while internal job openings may not exhibit this independence. For example, the number two individual at a unit that is performing well may be very unlikely to be promoted internally, because the chances of his superior leaving are particularly low during times of strong unit performance.
A final potential difference between internal and external promotion mechanisms arises from the fact that internal labor market transactions occur in the context of a firm's implicit and explicit contractual relationship with all of its employees, while external promotions do not. For example, reputational or incentive design considerations may lead a firm to promote an internal 6 In fact, this difference in information motivates several theoretical studies of job assignment. See, for example, Waldman (1984b) and Lazear (1986) .
candidate who was previously promised the promotion, even though the candidate is not the best person to fill the job. In contrast, if an outside firm were looking to hire away an individual from another firm, presumably they would simply choose the most talented individual.
Empirical strategy
Given the arm's length nature of external labor market transactions, our empirical strategy is to first examine the mechanism governing external labor market promotions in the market for professional football coaches. This analysis allows us to examine the role of objective performance metrics and other variables in outsiders' assessments of an individual's abilities. This analysis is of independent interest in the sense that it informs us on the role of the outside labor market on incentives and allows us to test the theory of Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982) on career concerns incentives induced by external labor market considerations. 7 In addition, this analysis allows us to establish a baseline of what labor market promotions look like in the absence of a long-term employment relationship.
After establishing this baseline, our strategy is to estimate models predicting internal promotions. In particular, we are interested in the role of objective measures of performance and other important individual characteristics (e.g., age and tenure) on the likelihood of an internal promotion. Viewed in isolation, this analysis allows us to assess the role of internal labor market rewards on incentives. Viewed in the context of our findings on external promotions, this evidence allows us to identify any substantial differences between internal and external labor 7 Note that Fee and Hadlock (2002a) have performed a similar analysis in the market for senior executive talent. In contrast to that study, in this study we have both aggregate and individual measures of performance. Thus we are able to more closely contrast and examine the metrics the external labor market uses in its assessment of an individual's ability. markets in promoting key personnel. For the differences we identify, we are interested in the extent to which these differences can be attributed to the considerations outlined in the previous subsection. Our data allow us to look most closely at the possibility that internal slot constraints and the process governing job openings leads to differences in internal and external promotion mechanisms and incentives.
Data and sample selection
Sample selection
We assemble a database of the names of all individuals employed by teams in the All teams have a set of more junior coaches who are subordinate to the head coach.
Since (American) football is a game where offensive play and defensive play are quite distinct and entail using a different set of players, teams generally organize their junior coaches into a set of offensive coaches and a set of defensive coaches. 10 At the head of the offensive (defensive) function is either the head coach himself or an offensive (defensive) coordinator. By the end of the sample period, 30 of the 31 NFL teams had an offensive coordinator and all 31 teams had a defensive coordinator. In the earlier sample years the head coach often acted as his own offensive and/or defensive coordinator.
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We will refer to the offensive and defensive coordinators as level-two coaches, while all other more junior coaches will be referred to as level-three coaches.
We report some basic summary sample statistics in 
Typical Career Paths
As we discuss in section 2, our primary empirical goal is to estimate models of how level-two coaches obtain promotions to level-one positions by moving within or across employers. Before conducting an analysis of these job movements (i.e., an analysis of what happens to our sample coaches), some relevant information can be gleaned from the background biographical data on each coach (i.e., information on how they got to where they are). To organize this information, in Table 2 we treat each person-position match as a single observation and report data on the previous position the individual held before the current assignment.
Interestingly, as the data in Panel A of Table 2 reveal, the majority of our sample coaches worked for a different NFL team immediately before getting their current position. For all three types of coaches, the fraction of individuals who were internally promoted to the current position is less than one third. The rest of the individuals were hired externally, in the majority of cases from other NFL teams, but in a small minority of cases from other professional leagues or the college ranks. These non-NFL sources of coaching talent appear more important when firms hire head coaches than when firms hire offensive or defensive coordinators. The data indicate that approximately 1 in 4 outside head coach hires come from non-NFL sources, while less than 10% of level-two coaches are hired from outside the NFL.
12
In Panel B of Table 2 we look at the previous positions held by individuals who obtained their current position without switching employers. We find here that for head coaches who were promoted internally, approximately half were promoted from level-two coaching positions and approximately half were promoted from level-three coaching positions. While this may suggest that some individuals "leapfrog" over their superiors from level three to level one, this is in fact not the case. Almost all of these level-three-to-level-one internal moves are in early years when many teams did not have a complete set of level-two coaches. 13 In these cases, a levelthree-to-level-one promotion should be roughly equivalent to a level-two-to-level-one 12 When head coaches are hired from outside the NFL, they almost always come from head coach positions in other professional leagues or the college ranks. The only exception in our sample is Hank Stram who joined the Dallas Texans (later renamed the Kansas City Chiefs) as head coach in 1960 after an assistant coaching stint at the University of Miami. 13 Note that since in Table 2 we are using biographical data for each position-person match, we are including data on the prior employer of head coaches in 1970 who were promoted many years earlier, say in 1960. The earlier the date of the hire the more likely the team did not have a full set of level-two coaches. For the set of internal head coach replacements after 1970, only 5 represented "leapfrog" situations in which a level-3 coach became a head coach for a team with a previously designated coordinator on his side of the ball (offensive or defensive). promotion. When we examine level-two coaches who were assigned to their current position without a change in employer, the figures in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that almost all of these individuals were promoted from a level-three coaching position with the same emphasis (offensive or defensive) as the position they are promoted into.
14 In Panel C of Table 2 we report the previous positions held by individuals who were hired into their current position from another team. As can be seen in the table, slightly more than half (55.26%) of externally hired head coaches were head coaches at a different employer, while the majority of the others were level-two coaches elsewhere. 15 In the case of level-two coaches who were hired externally, the figures in Panel C of Table 2 indicate that approximately 80% were previously either level-two or level-three coaches in positions with the same emphasis (offensive or defensive) as the position they were hired into. Note that some level-two coaches were previously employed elsewhere as head coaches, suggesting that downward moves or demotions in the external labor market are occasionally observed.
Taken as a whole, the figures in Table 2 paint a picture of a labor market with substantial inter-franchise mobility and a great deal of outside hiring. In the internal labor market there are some obvious promotion tracks, while demotions appear rare. In the external labor market, there is ample evidence of job changes that appear to be promotions, lateral moves, and demotions.
With regards to individuals with offensive versus defensive experience, there is no obvious preference to hire (internally or externally) head coaches with one type of experience over the other. However, it is clear that level-two positions are filled primarily with individuals with 14 The one case that may appear from Table 2 to be an internal demotion into a level two position is where the head coach of the San Diego Chargers in 1970 (Charlie Waller) became the offensive coordinator in 1971. However, his status as head coach in 1970 was only a temporary assignment that was made because the previous head coach became ill. As in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a) , outright demotions in the internal labor market appear very infrequent. 15 We suspect that externally hired head coaches who were previously level-three coaches elsewhere were generally very senior level-three coaches.
prior experience that emphasizes the same activity (offensive or defensive) as the position that is being filled. Consistent with some of the modeling by Gibbons and Waldman (2002) , these patterns are consistent with the notion that individuals develop job-specific human capital with experience, and this job-specific capital affects what types of jobs individuals are promoted into.
Categorizing job changes
We now turn our attention to examining the circumstances surrounding job changes in our panel. Since our emphasis is on the promotion of level-two coaches, we first discuss how we categorized the labor market movements of these individuals. For each observation where a person was in a level-two coaching position at the start of a season, we evaluate whether the individual was still in the same position at the start of the subsequent season. If the individual was in exact same position with the same team, we refer to this as a "no change" observation. If the individual was promoted to a higher-level position with the same team, we refer to this as an "internal promotion" observation. All cases in our sample where level-two coaches stay with their team but experience a change in job title are internal promotions.
In instances where level-two coaches separate from their team, using our panel of data we are able to identify whether the individual shows up at another team in a level-one or level-two coaching position. When the individual shows up as a head coach at a new team within one year of the start of the season where we identify the separation, we refer to this as an "external promotion." 16 When the individual shows up as a level-two coach at a new team within the same 16 We use this timing convention because we are concerned that individuals may voluntarily separate from their old team at the end of a season and then take a short time to evaluate their labor market opportunities. As long as the individual shows up at a higher-level position within approximately one year of his job separation, we categorize the change as an external promotion. Given the thinness of this labor market and the fact that most hiring and firing is window of time, we refer to this as a "lateral" (no pun intended) move. All other cases are referred to as "dismissals."
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The summary statistics for each of these five types of changes for our set of level-two coaches is reported in Panel A of Table 3 . As is evident from this table, the probability that a level-two coach stays in the same position for an entire year is in the 65-70% range, implying a great deal of turnover. The likelihood that a level-two coach is promoted internally is 2.57% for offensive coordinators and 2.68% for defensive coordinators. When level-two coaches depart, the most frequent outcome is that they do not show up at a new employer (i.e., an outcome that we would call a dismissal). However, in a substantial minority of cases these individuals do move to comparable or superior employment at a new team. The overall likelihood that a leveltwo coach moves laterally to a new employer in any given year is approximately 9% for both types of coordinators. The corresponding likelihood of being externally promoted to a head coaching job elsewhere is 3.40% for offensive coordinators and 2.68% for defensive coordinators. Based on these figures, the likelihood of an external promotion in any given year for a level-two coach appears roughly equal to the probability of an internal promotion.
Since part of the process governing internal promotions of level-two coaches will depend on the process governing the departure of level-one coaches, we also categorize the job changes of head coaches in our sample. Similar to our earlier labeling, if a head coach is serving at the start of one season and is still there at the start of the subsequent season, we refer to this as a "no change" observation. We refer to all observations where the head coach changes as done over a short window of time between seasons, this timing convention seems to be a reasonable way to identify cases where the external labor market rewards an individual because of a positive assessment of his talents. 17 Most coaches that show up at a new team do so fairly quickly. We have experimented with other timing conventions in defining these variables with regards to the window over which we look for new employment, and the results are very similar to what we report in the text. Note that if a level-two coach shows up at a level-three position elsewhere, we cannot track these movements and will end up categorizing this as a dismissal.
"separations". Since the economic event we are interested in tracking is a level-one position opening up, we do not distinguish between different types of head coach separations in our regression models. Since the vast majority of these are forced dismissals, however, we suspect, as the evidence in section 5 confirms, that the likelihood of separation will be negatively correlated with performance. 18 As we report in Panel B of Table 3 , the overall annual rate of separations for head coaches in our sample is 21.96%. As one would suspect given some of our earlier figures, the figures in the table also illustrate that approximately two thirds of these coaches are replaced by external hires.
Performance metrics and control variables
As we discuss in our introductory sections, we are particularly interested in the role of performance measures in explaining internal and external promotions. One of the advantages of our choice of a sports labor market is the wealth of available statistics that can be used to construct performance metrics. We collect this statistical data for the 1970-1998 seasons from by the total number of points scored during the season. We then convert this raw ranking into a percentile rank measure, where the highest ranking team in a given season (i.e., the one with the most points) is assigned a percentile rank of 1, and the lowest ranking team is assigned a percentile rank of 0. For defensive coordinators, we proceed in an analogous manner, but in this case we use points scored against the team as the measure of success. Thus, the team with the fewest points scored against them in a given season is assigned a percentile rank of 1, and the team with the most points scored against them receives a percentile rank of 0. The variable INDIVPERF is then set equal to these percentile rank numbers. The advantage of this variable is that it will, by construction, have stable distributional properties across seasons and across the two types of positions. The mean of this variable will be .5 in each year for each type of coach, and the maximum and minimum will always be 1 and 0 respectively. 19 Team winning percentage is defined to be [number of games won + .5 x number of games tied]/[number of games played]. 20 All percentile ranks in this paper are calculated by first constructing raw rankings (R) based on the chosen performance characteristic. The worst performer receives a raw rank of 1 and the best receives a rank equal to the number of observations in the set being ranked (N). All tied observations are assigned a raw rank equal to their median rank (e.g., if three teams are tied for 2 nd place, each is assigned a raw rank of 3). We then define the percentile rank of an observation to be equal to (R-1) /(N-1).
We report in Panels C and D of Table 3 
Analysis of labor market promotions
External labor market promotions
We now turn to modeling outcomes where level-two coaches depart to take level-one positions elsewhere. Our empirical approach is to run logit models where the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 for these external promotion outcomes and a value of 0 for outcomes where the level-two coach remains in his current position. 22 We include in these models variables related to the individual's age and tenure with the team along with a year trend.
23 21 There are many explanations for the positive correlation. If teams have high budgets, they may hire better players on both sides of the ball. Alternatively, if the offense is strong and keeps the ball for most of the game, the defense will have very little chance to be scored upon. 22 The dependent variable for all other labor market outcomes, for example dismissals, internal promotions, and lateral moves are coded as missing in the logit models of Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982) . These findings are also consistent with the recent empirical results reported by Fee and Hadlock (2002a) concerning the market for executive talent.
In column 4 of Table 4 we add to the logit specification the team performance variable (TEAMPERF). Interestingly, while this coefficient is positive, it is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant (t=1.35). At the same time, the coefficient on the individual performance variable remains positive and highly significant (t=2.85). These differences suggest 24 Given the nature of of the labor market we study and of our performance measures, we use levels of performance rather than changes in levels of performance in our regressions. This is the appropriate approach if, as NFL coaches attest, staying at the top takes at least as much talent and hard work as getting to the top in the first place. 25 As a formal test of differences in performance sensitivities, we added a term interacting position with performance to the specification of column 3 and found no statistically significant difference.
that the labor market relies more heavily on more micro-level performance metrics in their assessment of an individual's talents. 26 From an incentives perspective, this suggests that leveltwo coaches concerned with their external reputation will be more concerned with exhibiting excellence in the area they oversee (offense or defense) than in overall organizational performance (winning games). In many instances, of course, these two objectives are highly complementary to one another.
Note that in the specification of column 4, team performance serves as a control for other variables outside level-two coaches' control, such as overall player quality, head coach quality, etc. For this reason, this specification allows us to test an alternative hypothesis concerning the observed positive external promotion/performance sensitivity; namely, that the relationship is a function of teams trying to hire coaches who have "learned how to win" rather than a function of inferences about individuals' ability. Since the coefficient on individual performance remains significant even after controlling for team performance, it appears that ability inferences are the dominant factor in the labor market we study.
Turning to the other control variables, the most robust finding is that older coaches are less likely to be hired as head coaches elsewhere. The insignificance on the dummy variable for offensive vs. defensive coordinator suggests that both types of coaches have a similar likelihood of receiving an external promotion. Finally, there is some limited evidence (at the 10% level)
that external promotions have increased in likelihood over time. 26 These results are only suggestive, as the difference in the estimated coefficients on the two performance metrics is not significant. Certainly we can say with some confidence that individual performance metrics are at least as important as team metrics in evaluating talent. We additionally experimented with replacing TEAMPERF in the specification of column 4 with a variable representing the individual's counterparty's performance (i.e. adding defensive INDIVPERF for the offensive coordinator and offensive INDIVPERF for the defensive coordinator.) In that specification (unreported), INDIVPERF remained positive and significant at the 1% level and the counterparty performance variable was insignificant. Additionally, the coefficient on INDIVPERF was statistically greater than the coefficient on counterparty performance at conventional levels (p value<0.05, two-tailed t-test).
Using the external labor market findings as a baseline, we now turn to examining the internal promotion mechanism in our sample. For each observation, we create a dependent variable that takes a value of 1 for an internal promotion (i.e., the individual is promoted internally to the head coach position), and a value of 0 if the individual stays with his team and his title is unchanged. We pool all level-two coaches together and use specifications that parallel our external promotion analysis presented above. Our baseline results where the individual performance metric is the only performance measure are presented in column 1 of Table 5 . The coefficient on INDIVPERF in this specification is actually negative and insignificant.
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Thus, increased levels of individual performance in the sphere under an individual's control do not appear to be associated with an increased likelihood of being internally promoted to the top job.
All of the other control variables are insignificant.
From an incentives perspective, these results in column 1 of Table 5 are puzzling. They suggest, for example, that an offensive coordinator who successfully pushes his team to score more points will not, in fact, be rewarded with an increased likelihood of internal promotion. A reasonable explanation for this finding is as follows. When the offense scores a high number of points, teams tend to win. When teams win, the head coach keeps his job. Consequently, there is no job to promote the offensive coordinator into. Analogous remarks could be made for the defensive coordinator. This is a slot constraint type situation as discussed in the introductory sections. 27 We are able to test the differences in performance sensitivity between internal and external promotions by including both in a multinomial logit model of job market outcomes. When we do so, we find a large and very significant (t=4.6) difference between the coefficient on INDIVPERF for internal and external promotions for the specification analogous to column 3 of Table 4 and column 1 of Table 5 .
To further investigate, in the specification in column 2 of Table 5 we add as an additional control variable the team's overall performance (TEAMPERF). In this specification, the coefficient on team performance is negative and highly significant (t=-4.01), while the coefficient on individual performance is positive and significant (t=2.35). Thus, when firms are winning, it does appear that the chance of an internal promotion is low. Holding constant the winning percentage, increased performance by a given level-two coach will increase his likelihood of an internal promotion. However, since an increased level of individual performance tends to increase the likelihood of winning, the net effect of increasing individual performance on the internal promotion likelihood is best reflected in the column 1 specification, where the estimate is negative and insignificant.
The findings in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 for the internal labor market promotions contrast sharply with our earlier findings in Table 4 for external labor market promotions.
Clearly the net effect from raising the performance of the unit under your control on the likelihood of getting a head coaching position differs depending on the type of head coaching job under consideration (internal vs. external). Our results suggest that the difference in the internal labor market arises from the relationship between performance and the likelihood of a job opening. We will look at this more closely below where we estimate specific models of internal job openings and a team's decision of who to hire conditional on having an opening.
Before turning to this analysis, it is informative to examine the decision to dismiss leveltwo coaches. 28 To conduct this analysis, we create a dependent variable that equals 1 for leveltwo coaches who were dismissed (i.e., lost their position) and did not gain new employment, and equals 0 for level-two coaches whose position and team remain unchanged during the 28 This analysis parallels studies that examine departures of senior level executives directly below the CEO in large publicly traded corporations (e.g., Fee and Hadlock (2002b) , Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer (2002)).
observation-year. We report these results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 . In column 3, where the only performance metric is individual performance, the estimate on the performance variable is negative and significant. If an individual is performing poorly, he is more likely to be fired.
When we add the team performance metric in column 4, we find that the coefficients on both individual and team performance have similar estimated magnitudes which are negative and highly significant.
These findings on individual versus team performance metrics are interesting when viewed in contrast to our earlier findings on external labor market decisions. Our earlier results suggest that the external labor market behaves as if micro measures of performance are more related to an individual's talents than are macro or team measures. However, when a franchise is deciding to remove a level-two coach, it appears that they rely approximately equally on both micro and macro measures. We suspect that the significance of the macro performance measure in the firing of level-two coaches reflects the outcome of a process where, regardless of individual performance, level-two coaches no longer "fit well" in the organization after the head coach to which they owe their allegiance is fired. 
Job openings and promotions
Estimating models of job openings
The results for internal promotions in the previous section suggest that a level-two coach's individual performance is negatively related to the probability of a job opening. We 29 Results on the team nature of departures in the market for managerial talent are reported by Fee and Hadlock (2002b) and Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer (2002) .
suspect that this negative relationship arises because of the affect of team performance on the likelihood of the head coach keeping his job. To investigate, we model here a team's decision to replace its head coach. These models are quite analogous to models that are estimated in the literature on CEO turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) ).
In column 1 of Table 6 we present a logit model where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the head coach departs from the firm for any reason and a 0 if the head coach stays.
The coefficient on the team performance variable in this model is negative and highly significant The internal promotion opportunities for a level-two coach will depend not only on a team's decision to remove the head coach, but also on its decision to choose an internal replacement. It is well known that firms tend to choose outside CEOs when they are performing particularly poorly (e.g., Parrino (1997)). If similar behavior occurs in the coaching market, then strong team performance may increase the likelihood that the team promotes from within when an opening arises.
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To investigate, in column 2 (column 3) we run our logit model on a dependent variable that takes a value of 1 when firms replace their head coach and hire an outside replacement (inside replacement), and a value of 0 when the head coach remains with the team. The estimated coefficient on team performance is negative and significant in columns 2 and 3, but the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is substantially larger in the outside replacement model (column 2) than it is in the insider replacement model (column 3). 32 Thus, it does appear that poorer performance leads teams towards more outside hiring when the head coach is dismissed.
However, since head coaches generally are dismissed following poor performance, the overall relationship between team performance and the likelihood of an insider being promoted in any given year is still negative.
The evidence here clearly suggests that the weak relationship between individual performance and internal promotions is highly influenced by the endogenous process governing job openings. Teams that replace the head coach and promote an insider tend to be exhibiting poorer than average performance. Since strong individual performance tends to lead to strong team performance, the better performing level-two coaches are unlikely to have an internal job to be promoted into. This evidence, along with our earlier findings indicating substantial movement of level-two coaches across teams, suggests that internal slot constraints are often binding constraints in the coaching labor market
Choosing amongst internal candidates
32 Formal tests for differences in the team performance coefficient in the corresponding multinomial logit model reveals that this difference is significant at the 1% confidence level.
Certainly performance must count for something in the internal promotion process. To identify whether this is the case, our preceding findings suggest that we need to condition our analysis on the existence of a job opening. Thus, we investigate here the role of an individual's performance on the likelihood of a promotion conditional on the team promoting an insider. To conduct this analysis, we examine every case in the sample where the firm had both an offensive and defensive coordinator and where one of these individuals was promoted to the head coach position. We then use McFadden's (1973) conditional logit methodology to estimate a model predicting the team's choice of one of these two internal candidates over the other. The key independent variable of interest here is the individual performance measure.
The results from a very simple conditional logit model where the only independent variable is individual performance are reported in column 1 of Table 7 . Even though the sample is fairly small (24 promotions in sample of 2 x 24 = 48 individuals), the estimated coefficient on the internal performance measure has the expected positive sign, and it is significant at the 5% level (t=2.07) 33 . To gauge the magnitude of the effect, suppose that one of the level-two coaches exhibits performance at the 50 th percentile level. The estimates in column 1 imply that if the other level-two coach raises his performance from the 25 th percentile level to the 75 th percentile level, his likelihood of being chosen for the internal promotion increases from 28.7% up to 71.3%. It appears that when firms promote insiders, they rely heavily on individual performance metrics in evaluating the candidates.
To check the robustness of these findings, we include in column 2 of Table 7 several control variables that may affect a team's promotion choice including age, tenure, and a dummy variable that distinguishes between offensive and defensive coordinators. As the estimates 33 The number of internal promotions in this regression is less than the total number of internal promotions in the sample because a team must have both a designated offensive coordinator and a designated defensive coordinator to be included in the conditional logit.
reveal, none of these added control variables is significant at conventional levels. The performance variable remains positive, although its significance level falls slightly to the 10% level (t=1.70). The estimated economic magnitude of the role of performance on the choice of who to promote remains large in this specification.
Putting together the results from Tables 6 and 7 , we can now make some sense of our earlier finding of no positive relationship between promotions and the probability of an internal promotion. Using our estimates in column 3 of Table 6 , when a team's performance increases from the 25 th percentile level to the 75 th percentile level, the probability that one of the two leveltwo internal coaches gets promoted during the subsequent year decreases from 10.33% down to 4.02%. However, when individual performance increases by the same amount in percentile terms, the probability of a given level-two coach getting the job when it is offered to an insider increases from 28.7% up to 71.3%. In light of these estimated magnitudes, along with the high correlation between team performance and individual performance, it is straightforward to observe how the relationship between promotions and individual performance could be fairly flat, or even negative.
Lateral movements and relationships
Lateral moves
Most of our focus up to this point has been on labor market events that can clearly be classified as promotions. However, as our early summary statistics on coaching backgrounds revealed, there is a great deal of lateral movement across teams where level-two coaches switch employers without changing titles. This type of job-hopping is consistent with matching models where coaches search for employers where they fit well (e.g., Jovanovic (1979) ). We suspect, however, that issues of matching and fit in the coaching market are often driven by the closeness of the relationship between head coaches and their subordinates. In particular, a level-two coach may become a poor match for a firm after the head coach departs because of the loss of the relationship-specific human capital that was formed between the head coach and his assistants.
To investigate these issues, we estimate logit models predicting lateral moves for leveltwo coaches. The dependent variable in these models takes a value of 1 if a level-two coach moves laterally to a new employer, and a zero if he keeps his position. In column 1 of Table 8 we report results where the only performance variable is the individual performance metric. The estimated coefficient on individual performance in this specification is negative and significant (t=-4.28), indicating that coaches tend to move laterally following bouts of poor individual performance. In column 2 of Table 8 we add the team performance variable to the model. In this specification, the estimated coefficient on the individual performance variable becomes small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the team performance variable is negative and highly significant (t=-3.86). These estimates suggest that it is poor team performance rather than poor individual performance that drives coaches to move laterally. This is what we would expect if poor team performance leads to an increased likelihood of a head coach dismissal, which in turn may cause level-two coaches to look to make a lateral move.
It is interesting to compare these results in Table 8 on lateral moves for level-two coaches to our earlier Table 5 findings on dismissals of level-two coaches. It is clear from our estimates that poor team performance increases the likelihood of both a dismissal and a lateral move.
However, after controlling for team performance, it appears that individual performance does not independently affect the likelihood of a lateral move, but it certainly affects the likelihood of an outright dismissal (see Table 5 ). These findings suggest that separating from an employer is primarily related to the current employer's team performance, while job prospects elsewhere are primarily related to individual performance.
This suspicion is borne out in the findings in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 . Here we ask the question of whether a level-two coach gains new-employment as a level-two coach at a new team conditional on separating from his old team (and not obtaining a head-coach position). In these logit models, the coefficient on individual performance is positive and highly significant, while the coefficient on team performance is negative and insignificant. Consistent with our earlier findings on external promotions, these findings suggest that the external labor market relies primarily on individual performance in its assessment of talent.
Relationships in hiring and firing
The preceding findings suggest that many job separations of level-two coaches are driven by the departure of the head coach. To investigate directly, we examine the correlation in departure rates of level-two coaches and head coaches. As we report in Panel A of Table 9 , we observe that 73.68% of all level-two coaches depart when their head coach departs. This figure increases to 86.21% when the replacement head coach is an outsider. This suggests that the head coaching staff is viewed as a team, and they typically get fired as a group. This is what we would expect if the value of a level-two coach to his employer depends on the closeness of his relationship with the head coach.
If relationship specific capital affects the value of a coach to a team, we would expect it to affect hiring decisions as well as firing decisions. To examine whether this is the case, we identify in our sample every case where an outsider is hired as a head coach. We then investigate the identities of the level-two coaches that the head coach appoints to serve under him. We find that, when a newly appointed head coach appoints a new offensive or defensive coordinator, 19.66% of the time that individual comes from the same prior team as the head coach (see Panel B of Table 9 ). If the head coach were hiring randomly from the pool of all NFL teams, we would predict a figure here of 3.51%. A formal statistical test reveals that the observed figure differs from the predicted figure at high levels of significance (p-value < 0.01).
Thus, the data strongly indicate that coaches have a substantial propensity to hire coaches with whom they have established a relationship, presumably to take advantage of relationship specific human capital.
Conclusion
In this study we examine labor market outcomes for high-level coaches employed by National Football League teams from 1970 to 2001. Our analysis indicates that there are significant differences in the mechanism governing internal labor markets and external labor markets. In particular, we find that objective measures of a level-two coach's individual performance are significantly related to the likelihood that the coach obtains a promotion from the outside labor market in the form of a more prestigious position (i.e., a head coach/level-one position). In contrast, individual performance measures appear to be unrelated to the overall likelihood of an internal promotion.
We hypothesize that this difference between internal and external labor markets arises from the process governing job openings within the internal hierarchy, and we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our evidence indicates that the likelihood of a job opening at the top of the coaching hierarchy is negatively related to team performance. Since there is a strong causal link between individual performance and team performance, an increase in individual performance has a negative effect on the likelihood of a job opening appearing. Conditional on an internal opening occurring, we do find that increases in individual performance increase the probability of being promoted. It appears that these two effects roughly cancel out, resulting in an overall flat relationship between individual performance and the unconditional likelihood of an internal promotion.
Our evidence on external labor market transactions indicates that prospective employers look carefully at objective measures of individual performance in assessing a level-two coach's ability, while we find no strong evidence that outsiders also use team performance in making these ability inferences. This finding may have interesting implications in other labor markets where firms have some control over the information metrics available to outsiders. For example, firms often have some organizational design and accounting choices that affect the information flow to outsiders. These choices may affect both the incentives of their managerial employees and the behavior of outsiders looking to hire the best of these employees.
The findings we present also suggest that relationships matter a great deal in this labor market. In particular, we find that coaches are often dismissed as a group. When the head coach is fired, his subordinates are very likely to also separate from the franchise. In addition, we find evidence that coaches are hired as a group. In particular, when a new head coach is hired, he tends to bring along subordinates with whom he has had a past relationship. This evidence on hiring and firing suggests that the value of an individual to an employer depends on the identity of the entire set of individuals who work together, and the value of this group as a whole depends on the closeness of their accumulated stock of relationship-specific human capital.
While the results we present are drawn from a specific labor market, we believe that some general lessons can be drawn from our empirical analysis. First, our evidence suggests that internal promotion incentives to increase performance may not be very strong at the top of an organizational hierarchy. Since there are very few top positions to go around, and since the internal prospects of individuals at the top are closely related, it is quite rare for strong individual performance to lead to an internal promotion. Thus, while some have argued that tournament type promotion incentives in organizations are very strong, our evidence here casts doubt on the generality of this assertion. Certainly more work, both theoretical and empirical, is needed to fully understand how job constraints and the endogenous process governing job openings affect careers and incentives in organizational hierarchies.
A second lesson that can be drawn from our evidence is that there may be some important differences between an individual's overall incentive to raise his team's performance and his incentive to raise his individual performance. Since individuals tend to be fired as a group, there is a strong individual incentive to raise overall team performance to avoid the unhappy outcome where everyone gets the axe. At the same time, if one can somehow lower team performance while exhibiting strong individual performance, there is a chance of getting the coveted internal promotion. Finally, independent of the level of team performance, it is clear that strong individual performance enhances external labor market opportunities. Sorting out the relative strength of the incentives to raise these performance metrics is an interesting question for future research.
quite active and can serve as important incentive devices. While professional football coaches switch employers more than most, there is ample evidence of substantial movement across employers in other labor markets, notably the market for managerial talent in large corporations (e.g., Hadlock (2002a, 2002b) ). In organizations where external labor markets are active, our evidence suggests that firms should carefully consider the information concerning individual performance that outsiders can observe.
Finally, we note here that our results suggest that there may be some interesting relationships between how jobs are assigned, both internally and externally, and other dimensions of the employment relationship, in particular compensation policies. For example, following the thinking of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , it may be that when labor markets reward certain outcomes, for example high levels of individual performance, these outcomes are less heavily emphasized in explicit compensation arrangements. These types of possibilities suggest that understanding the role of internal and external labor markets may be a particularly interesting topic for future research. (1) and (2) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for internal promotions and 0 for no change observations, both as defined in Table 3 . For the models reported in Columns (3) and (4) it is set equal to 1 for dismissals and 0 for no change observations, also as defined in Table 3 Note: The dependent variable in all above specifications equals 0 for no change observations, as defined in Table 3 . The dependent variable takes on the value of 1 for various subsets of separations, also defined in Table 3 . In all other cases, the dependent variable is set to missing. , normalizes the performance distribution into a 0 to 1 scale with 0 being the worst, 1 being the best, and 0.5 being the mean. Year is equal to the calendar year at the start of the season minus 1970. Predicted probabilities are derived from the logit models by varying TEAMPERF and maintaining all other variables at their means. Reported are coefficient estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) Significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level using a two-tailed t-test. McFadden (1972) ) models predicting promotion probabilities for offensive and defensive coordinators conditional on (1) the team having both slots filled at the start of one year and (2) one of the individuals serving as the team's head coach at the start of the next year. The dependent variable in the reported logit specifications is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for internal promotions as defined in Table 3 *** (**, *) Significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level using a two-tailed t-test. (1) and (2) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for lateral moves and 0 for no change observations, both as defined in Table 3 . For the models reported in Columns (3) and (4) it is set equal to 1 for lateral moves and 0 for dismissals, also as defined in Table 3 . The dependent variable is set to missing for all other observations. The sample of coaches is drawn from all National , normalizes the performance distribution into a 0 to 1 scale with 0 being the worst, 1 being the best, and 0.5 being the mean. Year is equal to the calendar year at the start of the season minus 1970. Predicted probabilities are derived from the logit models by varying INDIVPERF, while maintaining all other variables at their means. Reported are coefficient estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) Significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) confidence level using a two-tailed t-test. 
